We now have the passage of time on our side and can attest to the devastating facts concerning Covid 19 and the devastating injections. This devastation was driven by FEAR. Right in step with WHO, et al, FDA Commissioner, Dr David Kessler stokes fear in a NY Times article concerning the H5N1 Bird Flu.
Karl Jablonowski, Ph.D. practices data science by asking questions of databases that can reveal population-based adverse outcomes of medical interventions. Thank you to Bobby Kennedy’s Children’s Health Defense.
Dr. David A. Kessler recently wrote an opinion piece in The New York Times expressing his concern about — and stoking fear of — the H5N1 bird flu. If COVID-19 taught us anything, it was to fear the fear mongers.
Dr. David A. Kessler, a commissioner for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in two previous administrations, the Biden administration’s chief science officer during COVID-19 and co-leader of Operation Warp Speed, recently wrote an opinion piece in The New York Times expressing his concern about the H5N1 bird flu.
Kessler was not necessarily at the helm of the worst regulatory disaster in human history — but he was certainly on the bridge. Kessler’s Nov. 26 opinion piece is designed to stoke fear.
After the last five years, we should all have a healthy fear of fearmongers. Based on fear, in our country alone we have seen: our constitutional rights vanish, internment camps once again built on U.S. soil, lethal countrywide hospital protocols for intubation and a widely used and lucrative drug remdesivir that was too dangerous for Ebola patients, suppression of cheap and effective treatments, mass-distribution of a mandated untested and unsafe vaccine, threats from our political leaders, fractures in society, destroyed careers, destroyed families and destroyed lives.
Almost no one went unscathed during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Kessler’s advice to the incoming administration is out of touch and out of tune with the people who voted President Donald Trump back into office.
“Fear” was in yesteryear’s toolbox for so-called public health. The new administration has nominated a host of leaders who bring integrity, transparency, scientific reasoning and justice to their approach to our common health.
To Kessler’s credit, bird flu is concerning. It is a few mutations away from finding the right combination to become communicable between humans, and a novel influenza virus may cause sickness and death.
This is as true in 2024 as it was in 100,000 BCE — bird flu has been a looming threat to humans for as long as there have been humans.
Humans created the right conditions for animals to spread bird flu
Our agricultural practices have created the conditions conducive to invigorating the viral evolution of bird flu. Two conditions are needed for bird flu virus to infect mammals: ample opportunity to replicate and ample exposure to mammals.
We have given bird flu the ample opportunity to replicate. Bird flu does exist in the wild, and a sick bird in that setting can spread it to a few others. In 2020, the U.S. raised 9.22 billion broiler chickens, almost all in an extremely confined space — with each individual allotted a space smaller than the computer screen you may be reading right now.
The health of the animal in the modern economics meets modern agriculture operations is of concern only insofar as the animals are healthy enough (by rubber-stamping U.S. Department of Agriculture standards) to be slaughtered. In that setting, a sick animal may spread bird flu to all of the 50,000 animals in the same building, and the similarly concentrated surrounding buildings.
Many poultry “farms” have a population in the millions. These are breeding grounds for sickness where humans do not enter without personal protective equipment. Under these conditions, the bird flu virus may replicate many more times than it could in the natural world.
The second component is ample exposure to mammals, and modern economics meets modern agriculture provides this one too. There are about 100 million cows in the U.S., concentrated and confined in analogous conditions, often close to poultry operations.
The more exposure a bird flu virus has to a mammal, the more combinations of mutations are tried against mammalian immune systems. Since humans are more biologically similar to cows than birds, the H5N1 now in cows can more easily jump to humans — as we are seeing in dairy workers.
The concern is that with the more exposure of humans to infected cows, the more combinations the virus gets to try, and may result in a strain that is transmissible between humans.
Reports of bird flu-related deaths are biased
On Nov. 1, the World Health Organization (WHO) published an updated version of its cumulative number of confirmed human cases and mortalities in the 22 years from 2003-2024. The document catalogs 939 cases of bird flu and 464 deaths in 24 countries — a mortality rate of 49.4%.
Of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-classified developed countries in the report (Australia, Canada, Spain, U.K. and U.S.) there were a total of 54 cases and one death — a mortality rate of 1.85%.
When Kessler writes “as outbreaks continued to occur, the mortality rate surpassed 50 percent” that’s not the story of the U.S. nor the IMF developed nations but of Cambodia, China, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam which accounted for 86.9% of the cases and 92.2% of the deaths.
These are not population-wide surveillance numbers. Testing for H5N1 is a relatively expensive effort, and most likely reserved for only the seriously ill (and U.S. dairy workers, with the most common symptom of pink eye) — leaving asymptomatic or mild illness cases undocumented.
With this bias, a mortality rate is impossible to measure and a folly to estimate.
Existing bird flu vaccines only up to 70% effective and our stockpile is inadequate
Kessler’s assessment of human products for combating bird flu is that antivirals are less effective with novel strains, monoclonal antibodies are not commercially available, and we will have a national stockpile of maybe 10 million doses of an H5N8/H5N6 (not H5N1) vaccine.
The hope lies in crossover immunity, that a vaccine targeting H5N8/H5N6 might help the immune system recognize and combat H5N1.
Ten million doses is not enough for the country, or even a theoretical pandemic-susceptible portion of the country. Even if we had enough doses, the vaccine is not effective enough (estimated at between 30% and 70%) to make a population-wide immunity difference.
So, Kessler turns to the solution of mRNA vaccines which “could offer more effective countermeasures in response to worrisome mutations.”
Out-of-control self-amplifying mRNA vaccines will be just as bad as COVID mRNA vaccines
In July, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services awarded Moderna $176 million to develop an mRNA H5N1 vaccine, and the WHO launched an initiative to develop such mRNA vaccines.
By November, the FDA gave Arcturus Therapeutics’ ARCT-2304 the “study can proceed” notification.
The self-amplifying mRNA vaccine poses a real safety concern of recombination into an existing successful virus, forever changing Earth’s virome and posing a threat to human and animal health.
The claim is that self-amplifying mRNA vaccines require a lower dose than conventional mRNA vaccines, and are therefore safer. Since these vaccines amplify themselves, the actual dose of antigen a person may be exposed to is unknown and unknowable.
*Kessler proposes that a theoretical virus that could replicate out of control and infect others be prophylactically combated with a real vaccine that replicates out of control and may infect others.
An H5N1 mRNA vaccine will come with many of the same adverse effects as the COVID-19 mRNA vaccines — except instead of the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein there will be an H5N1 antigen.
Every vaccine contains billions of lipid nanoparticles (LNPs) which have a free pass through every membrane in your body, down to the eggs of an unborn fetus.
The threat of disease pathogenesis from the potential for cellular disruption caused by the persistent presence of the pseudouridine-stabilized mRNA will still exist.
The polyethylene glycol (PEG) in the LNP coating, and the reactions to it, will still exist.
The DNA contamination housed within the LNP, and the diseases resulting from it, will still exist.
With the added self-amplifying function, the antigen exposure will not be limited by the time it takes for the initial stabilized mRNA template to degrade but will persist indefinitely. Chronic antigen stimulation has a deleterious effect on the immune system’s T cells.
Japan approved Arcturus Therapeutics’ self-amplifying COVID-19 mRNA vaccine for 65-year-olds and up this fall and winter season. The world waits, with foreboding interest, for the first population-wide immune health studies.
Lab leaks are not isolated incidents
When Kessler says “No one knows how many mutations will be required to set off human-to-human respiratory spread … the incoming Trump administration needs to be prepared” he’s attempting to incite fear.
The fear that Kessler stokes, with the ineffective therapeutics and the unknowns of viral evolution, would lead some to embrace gain-of-function research, again.
In 2013, two lab accidents exposed Madison, Wisconsin, to a mammalian-infecting highly pathogenic H5N1 strain created by virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka’s lab. Since there is no biosecurity barrier between Madison and the rest of the world, either incident could have resulted in a research lab-initiated pandemic.
These are not isolated incidents. Labs leak.
The proximal origin theory of the highly pathogenic strain of H5N1, clade 2.3.4.4b, cannot be ignored. The pathogen last seen in the Netherlands first appears in the U.S. — over 4,000 miles and a really large ocean away — within just 200 miles of the USDA Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory (SEPRL).
Children’s Health Defense has an outstanding Freedom of Information Act request for the pathogenic sequences studied at SEPRL before the new (clade 2.3.4.4b) bird flu strain appeared in the U.S.
If the Wuhan Institute of Virology has taught us anything, it is to be careful about what we study in the lab — because it won’t necessarily remain there.
